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IN THE CHRONOGRAPHIA, IS MICHAEL PSELLOS’ CONCERN
FOR THE ARMY ENTIRELY DISINTERESTED?
The present article analyzes Psellos’ commentary on the disarray of the
B y z a n t i n ea r m yi nt h eChronographia. The topic is examined in relation to the polit-
ical circumstances of the time, and the author’s own particular situation. It is possi-
ble to conclude that much of his commentary on the military in the Chronographia is
disingenuous and is influenced by his own position and interests.
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Michael Psellos’ Chronographia, one of the finest works of Byzantine liter-
ature, still attracts the interest of modern scholars who try to decode the elusive
meanings and motivations that may lay hidden beneath the surface of the text.1
Political unrest and endless court intrigues would induce an opinion and a com-
mentary conducive to his own survival. Truth, in this respect, may have been sub-
jugated and commentary may have been formed by his own interests.
It is true that government control changed hands many times after Basil II’s
death (1025). Thus, Psellos had to write his book in a way that would not allow
judgements to be made about his political beliefs. Above all, he had to convince
his audience of the sincerity of his patriotism. His claim to be filorwmaioj and
filopatrij, admirer of the Romans and lover of his country ‰‡6. 154.3,
‡6.190.7Š,2 has led Anthony Kaldellis to conclude that “the Chronographia is
1 Citations of the Chronographia are from the edition of S. Impellizzeri, Michele Psello Im-
peratori Di Bisanzio (Cronografia), vols.1 – 2 ,intro. D. Del Corno, comm. U. Criscuolo, trans. S.
Ronchey, Milan 1984 (= Psellos).
2 On the Byzantines’ conviction about their descent from Romans, see R. Macrides — P.
Magdalino, The Fourth Kingdom and the Rhetoric of Hellenism, ed. P. Magdalino, The Perception of
the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe, London — Rio Grande 1992, 120.
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Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’etudes byzantines XßIX, 2012heavily biased in favor of the military”.3 The present paper proposes a re-evalua-
tion of Kaldellis’ thesis suggesting instead that Psellos is motivated solely by po-
litical interests. I am going to divide the article into two sections. In the first, I
shall examine the author’s four references to the military, while in the second I
shall discuss the treatment of military governors and generals in the text as well as
their relationship with Psellos himself.
The first reference is found in the section of Romanos III Argyros’ rule
(1028–1034). Psellos admonishes him for spending much money on building a
magnificent church to the Virgin, and not replenishing the imperial treasury or in-
v e s t i n gi nt h ea r m y :
ei ti kai peri touj ektojk osmouj paranomeinc r h, twnt eb a s i l e iwn
epimeleisqai kai katakosmeint hn akropolin kai ta dierrwgota sunaptein,
plhreij te toujb a s i l e iouj poieinq h s a u r o ujk a i stratiwtika tauta hgeisqai
ta crhmata, o de toutou men hmelei, opwj de o naoja utJ kalliwn para touj
allouj deiknuoito, talla katelumaineto. ‰‡3.15.26–31Š
It is known that in the summer of 1030 the Byzantines suffered a heavy de-
feat in Syria.4 However, neither of the contemporary Byzantine authors associates
this terrible event with crisis in the army. In the Synopsis of histories, John
Skylitzes infers that the defeat was attributable to lack of water sources and to
dysentery.5 On the other hand, the Chronographia attributes failure to the em-
peror’s inadequacy with regard to military affairs ‰‡3.2.9–13Š. But if the army was
not degraded at that time to justify the statement of Psellos,6 what purpose does it
serve for him to attack Romanos’ handling of imperial funds? To answer this
question we must look at the political environment prevailing in the palace.
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3 A. Kaldellis, The Argument of Psellos’ Chronographia, Leiden–Boston–Koln 1999, 182.
4 The Armenian historian Matthew of Edessa testifies that 20,000 Byzantines were killed in
that battle.( A. E. Dostourian, Armenia and the Crusades Tenth to Twelfth Centuries. The Chronicle of
Matthew of Edessa, Lanham — New York — London 1993, 51.) Though the number might be inflated,
it gives us, however, a rough idea of the high losses the army of Romanos III sustained against the
Arabs.
5 Skylitzes, Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis historiarum, ed. I. Thurn, CFHB V, Berlin — New
York 1973, 381.20–21 (= Skylitzes).
6 It should be noted here that modern scholars chronologically place the beginning of the
army’s collapse not earlier than the reign of Constantine Monomachos (1042–1055). See the two pa-
pers presented at the eleventh International Symposium “The Empire in Crisis (?) Byzantium in the
11th Century (1025–1081)”, ed. V. N. Vlyssidou, Athens 2003, by S. Vryonis, The Eleventh Century:
was there a Crisis in the Empire? The Decline of Quality and Quantity in the Byzantine Armed forces,
17–43; and by D. Tsougarakis, Ha u t o k r a t o r ias ek r ish kai h optikh twn sugcronwn: mia
anagnwsh twn marturiwn, 275–290. To the above we could add the books of W. Treadgold, Byzan-
tium and Its Army, 284–1081, Stanford U.P. 1995, 39–40; and of M. Gregoriou — Ioannidou,
parakmh kai ptwsh tou qematikou qesmou, Thessalonike 2007, 121–123, who states that the the-
matic armies ceased to exist in around the middle of the eleventh century. Main advocates of the the-
ory that there was no military crisis in that period are: J. Haldon, Approaches to an Alternative Mili-
tary History of the Period ca. 1025–1071, 45–74 (this article has also been published by the eleventh
International Symposium in Athens); and J.-C. Cheynet, La politique militaire byzantine de Basile II a
Alexis Comnene, ZRVI 29/30 (1991) 61–74.In book three, Psellos shows his antipathy to Romanos’ pretentious
theologians and to John the Orphanotrophos,“ a eunuch of bad and contemptible
fortune” ‰‡3.18.3–4Š. The first are censured for superficial understanding of the
Hellenic philosophical texts ‰‡3.3Š, while the second for being hostile to those de-
voted to the study of the paideia of ancient Greeks ‰‡4.14.12–15Š. What they all
have in common is their presence to the close circle of Romanos. The theologians,
however, did not pose an immediate threat to Michael Psellos who, as has been
said,7 was exceptionally tolerant of views different from his own. The same can-
not be asserted for the Orphanotrophos, a monk not conforming to monastic dic-
tates ‰‡4.14.9–12Š. According to Kaldellis, monks are treated in the
Chronographia negatively, for “they consumed the resources of the State and
gave trusting rulers false hopes”.8 But can this be the main reason behind Psellos’
aversion to the Orphanotrophos? In all likelihood, he had personally faced the
Orphanotrophos’ hostility, because he too studied Hellenic paideia. Moreover, it
may not be coincidence that his introduction to the palace court occurred when
John the Orphanotrophos fell from favour. The latter emerged under Romanos III
Argyros,9 but he became very powerful when Michael IV Paphlagon (1034–1041)
took the throne.10 The influential monk was, therefore, a major obstacle in the
path to Psellos’ political success.11
Those considerations lead us to conclude that the Chronographia is not re-
ally interested in Romanos’ financial or military policies. Rather, it stresses the in-
competence of his consultants to detect the causes of future threats, and proposes
to advertise Psellos’ skills as a philosophical court advisor (this is a feature
throughout his book).
The second reference is taken from the section describing the joint rule of
Zoe with Theodora (1042). The empresses, who had become very popular with
both the military and civilian population ‰‡6.1.3–6Š,12 are blamed for their lar-
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7 J. N. Ljubarskij, Hp r o s w p i k othta kai to ergo tou Micahl Yellou, Athens 2004, 184, tr.
A. Tzelesi, following the Russian ed. Mihail Psell. Li~nost’ i tvor~estvo, Moscow 1978.
8 Kaldellis, Argument, 88.
9 Skylitzes, 390.70–71.
10 Whereas Romanos III is strongly censured in the Chronographia, Michael IV is highly
praised. One may infer that the author’s judgement on them relies entirely on the outcome of their mil-
itary operations. The former suffered a crushing defeat in Syria, while the latter won a resounding vic-
tory in the Balkans. Such an inference is rejected by the statement of Psellos that precedes his descrip-
tion of the war against Bulgarians:“ Nikv (i.e. Michael IV) gounp r o twnb a r b arwn touj
oikeiotatouj, kai tropaion kai kata suggeneiaj kai kata filiaj kai kaq’ eautou isthsin¶”
‰‡4.43.5–7Š. This statement, whose position in the text cannot be accidental, explicitly refers to the
emperor’s relatives who failed to prevent him from accomplishing his plan ‰‡4.42.7Š. For Psellos, the
fact that Michael IV did not listen to his brothers, and mostly John the Orphanotrophos himself, but he
acted on his own decision was a determining factor in the final success of his campaign.
11 Psellos, ‡5.27.7, mentions that his own career advanced to the imperial asekretai
(secretaries) when Michael V Kalaphates (1041–1042) was elevated to the throne.
12 It emerges from the account of Skylitzes, 422.12–15, that the two sisters restored order and
justice in the state. Also, it must be noted that they conferred the rank of magister on the experiencedgesse to individuals, and the diversion of funds from the army to the court of the
palace:
Ta mentoi ge twns t r a t i w t wn aqla kai oi thjs t r a t h g iaj poroi ef’ eterouj
oudend eon metekinounto kai metetiqento (plhqoj outoi kolakwn kai h
thnikauta twnb a s i l idwn doruforia), wsper epi toutoij tou autokratoroj
Basileiou toujb a s i l e iouj qhsauroujc r h m atwn empeplhkotoj. ‰‡6.8Š
At first sight, this reference might seem as though Psellos is expressing his
genuine concern for the army. However, a closer inspection reveals some incon-
sistencies and ambiguities in the text which lead us to infer that his statement is
evidently based on selfish motives and political calculations. These are as follow:
a) Earlier in book six, we learn that men loyal to the two sisters administered
the civil and military affairs carefully ‰‡6.2.6–11Š; but later, as said above, they are
criticized for the diversion of the salaries of soldiers to court officials and bodyguards.
Could things have completely changed within fifty days of their joint rule?13
b) Commenting on the state affairs, Psellos claims that their situation
demanded urgent attention advocating that someone with administrative experi-
ence should assume the reins of power to fend off enemy invasions ‰‡6.10.2–8Š;
but further down in the text, he declares that the spirit and strength of the empire
were still alive ‰‡6.48.3–4Š.14
c) It raises questions that the two sisters are not included in Psellos’ critical
appraisal of rulers responsible for the ruin of the state ‰‡‡7.52–57Š, although he con-
siders that their era marked “the beginning of trouble” for Byzantium ‰‡6.9.5Š.
Those remarks strengthen the possibility that the chief target of Psellos’ crit-
icism is not Zoe and Theodora themselves, but the courtiers —“ flatterers”, in his
own word — who greatly benefited from them ‰‡6.7.4–6Š. These courtiers were
appointed to direct important departments of state. Psellos, on the other hand, did
not enjoy the two sisters’ favour and support,15 even though he was able to predict
the outcomes of future policies (he implies that he was among the few intellectuals
having the ability of prophecy (manteia) ‰‡6.7.9–13Š).16 In the light of this con-
sideration we must also see his writings on the reasons leading to the state’sd i s a s -
ters ‰‡6.9Š. His writings reflect those individuals who were offered government of-
fices and received donations simply because they were skilled in soothsaying
‰‡6.5.9–12Š.
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and most successful general of his time, George Maniakes, and they sent him back to Sicily in order to
stabilize the situation there ‰ibid., 422.23–26Š.
13 They reigned together from 21 April to 11 June.( Die Byzantinischen kleinchroniken, ed. P.
Schreiner, CFHB XII/1, Vienna 1975, 142).
14 It is the section devoted to the rule of Constantine IX who benefited Psellos.( S e em o r ei n
Ljubarskij, Proswpikothta, 46–51).
15 There exists no evidence that Psellos had been promoted to a higher rank over the joint rule
of Zoe with Theodora.
16 There are two more cases in the Chronographia where Psellos advertises his prophetic cha-
risma: a) the political vicissitudes in Byzantium soon before Constantine IX’s death ‰‡6a. 10.3–7Š;
and b) the appointment of Leichoudes to the patriarchal seat ‰‡7.66.24–27Š.Psellos’ commentary thus on the financial neglect of the army relies on
grounds of self-interest, and would appear to designate the courtiers who had more
influence at times when he had less. What should not escape our notice is that the
military element had become a very sensitive matter in the period when the first
part of the Chronographia was composed.17 This was because the frontier com-
munities suffered greatly from foreign invasions, and as such they had been long
discontented with each emperor’s policies.18 Through the criticism of inadequate
military spending, our author is trying to attach much importance to his account,
inviting also rulers to exploit his prophetic powers for their own advantage.
The third reference is excerpted from book seven where Psellos tells us that im-
perial supremacy rests upon three factors: the citizens, the senate, and the military.
However, the rulers of his times ignored the last factor in favour of the other two:
Ent r i s i de toutoij thjf u l a k hja utoij istamenhj, dhmotikJ plhqei, kai
sugklhtikV taxei, kai suntagmati stratiwtikJ, thjm ent r ithj htton
frontizousi, toijd ’alloij euqujt aj ekt o u kratouj prosnemousi caritaj.
‰‡7.1.9–13Š
This is Psellos’ introduction to the short rule of Michael VI Stratiotikos
(1056–1057) who showed marked kindness to the members of the senate and vari-
ous civil functionaries, but he took no personal interest in the army ‰‡7.2Š.
Psellos’ statement seems to contain a strong patriotic component, but it must be
treated with caution nevertheless. T h a tw a sa ne r aw h e nh eh a df a l l e ni n t od i s -
grace due to the enormous influence the monk Leo Paraspondylos exerted in the
palace.19 In the Chronographia, the first signs of the author’s antipathy to Leo be-
come evident in the reign of Theodora. The empress is criticized for not appoint-
ing as chief minister a man distinguished in speech and eloquence (presumably,
the author refers to himself),20 but for selecting the incompetent Leo instead
‰‡6a.6.7–10Š.21
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17 It embraces the period from Basil II to the end of Isaac I Komnenos, and is believed to have
been written between 1061 and 1063. J. Sykutris, Zum Geschichtswerk des Psellos, BZ 30 (1929/ 30)
63 ff.; and J. Hussey, Michael Psellus, The Byzantine Historian, Speculum 10 (1935) 83.
18 The situation, which had changed since the reign of Monomachos, is vividly described by
Psellos, ‡6.104.24–28: “…di’ orghjt et ona utokratora econtaj (i.e. oi ent V Polei)…kai thn
proedrian autou discerainontaj kai boulomenouj stratiwthn ideina utokratora, sfwnt e
prokinduneuonta kai taj epidromajt wnb a r b arwn aneirgonta.” Attaleiates, furthermore, notifies in
the section referring to the reign of Constantine X Doukas (it was the period when the first part of the
Chronographia of Psellos was written): “ Hgeireto garp o l uj goggusmoj …twn katadromaj
ufistamenwn barbarikajd i a to mh kata logon ton stratiwtikonk a t alogon ginesqai.” ‰Miguel
Ataliates Historia, intro.-ed.-trans.-comm. I. P. Martin, Madrid 2002, 58.22–59.1 (= Attaleiates)Š.
19 Paraspondylos (or Strabospondylos) emerged under Michael IV Paphlagon ‰Skylitzes,
479.15–17Š, but he disappears from the political stage over the rule of Constantine IX. Then,
Theodora (1055–1056) assigned him to direct the state’s public affairs ‰Psellos,‡ 6 a.7.1–2Š, a position
w h i c hh ea l s or e t a i n e di nt h er e i g no fM i c h a e lV I‰Skylitzes, 486.3–4Š.
20 This conjecture has been formulated by Ljubarskij, Proswpikothta,1 4 1 .
21 Neither Skylitzes nor his near contemporary Attaleiates embrace Psellos’ view on Leo
Paraspondylos. Skylitzes, 479.15–16, portrays Leo as a person of great experience in affairs, while
Attaleiates, 39.6–9, as a reputable man who executed the functions of his office in the most able way.Psellos could not further his career as a courtier so long as Leo directed pub-
lic affairs. This is strongly felt in the events relating to the military revolt of 1057
against the central government. The people involved in Michael VI’s ascension to
the throne (Leo and Theodora’s consultants, we may presume)22 are censured in
the Chronographia for taking no measures to stop the riotous army. Michael VI
called a council to decide what should be done. For this reason, he assembled a
good many of the previously out of favour spiritual notables — our author situates
himself among them ‰‡7.9Š. The latter was given a great opportunity to undermine
Leo when he was authorized to reach a diplomatic agreement with the rebel
leader, Isaac Komnenos ‰‡7.15.1–5Š.23 A c c o r d i n gt ot h et e x t , one of the conditions
for Komnenos to offer surrender was the removal of Leo Paraspondylos from his
ministerial office ‰‡7.32.26–27Š. In the narrative sequence, this information fol-
lows Psellos’ specific explanations to the rebel:“ As to the terrible things you say
that you have suffered, others are guilty of them, but not the present emperor”
‰‡7.30.19–20Š. Apparently, Psellos is inferring that the culpability is Leo’s.24
Though Attaleiates says nothing of this mission, Skylitzes adds to his account a
considerable detail: Psellos with his colleagues secretly approached Katakalon
Kekaumenos — one of the main conspirators — and they tried to convince him to
reject the emperor’s terms of agreement.25
All those elements converge to the conclusion that the downfall of Leo was
an act of treason aiming at helping Psellos to rise to power again.26 The latter uti-
lizes a relationship with the military in order to open a new era in his own career,
after the death of Constantine IX, via the removal of his political contestant, Leo
Paraspondylos.
The final reference is encountered in the rule of Constantine X Doukas
(1059–1067) who is blamed for diverting intended military expenditure to the giv-
ing of expensive gifts, as a means of settling international differences.27
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22 Psellos,‡ 6 a.20, testifies that those people suggested Theodora to deliver the sceptre to Mi-
chael VI Stratiotikos who could not avoid being an instrument in their hands.( Also, Attaleiates,
39.12–17; Skylitzes, 480.31–40).
23 See, Skylitzes, 496.81–86. It is important to mention here that initially Psellos, ‡‡7.15–17, had
rejected Michael VI Stratiotikos’ request for fear he would be accused of treason by other courtiers. His
account leaves one with the impression that Psellos was not safe at all in the current political climate.
24 We may note here that both Kaldellis, Argument, 155–160, and R. Anastasi, Studi sulla
“Chronographia” di Michele Psello, Catania 1969, 128–129, limit Psellos’ hostility to Leo to the con-
tradictory philosophical principles of the two men. Criscuolo, in his comments to the “Cronografia”,
vol. 2, 421–423, asserts that Psellos’ criticism does not, in fact, apply to Leo, who was an inferior per-
sonality, but to the patriarch Keroularios. The reference of Psellos to the three kinds of soul ‰‡6a.8Š
can also be seen as an attempt to deflect the readers’ attention from his own political ambition, and to
turn it towards a deeper idealistic contemplation that reflects Leo’s overall behaviour. In other words,
the author wishes to make clear that zealous religiosity cannot correlate with politicization.
25 Skylitzes, 497.11–13.
26 J.–C. Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations a byzance (963–1210), Paris 1996, 344, n. 36; and
E. De Vries — Van Der Velden, Les amities dangereuses: Psellos et Leon Paraspondylos, BSl 60
(1999) 315–350, esp. 347–348.
27 In particular, Attaleiates, 62.25–26, remarks that the emperor was trying to restrain the inva-
sions of Pechenegs with peace treaties.to gounb o u l omenon autJ hnm h polemoij ta peri twn eqnwnd i a t iqesqai, alla
dwrwn apostolaijk a i tisin eteraij filofrosunaij, duoin eneka, ina mhte ‰taŠ
pleiw katanaliskoi toijs t r a t i wtaij, kai autojd i a g w g hn ecoi aqorubon.
‰‡.7a.17.5–9Š
The emperor, through his policy, wished to increase the revenues of the
state, and thus enjoy a carefree life style. This had as a result that the military or-
ganization was undermined, while the enemy enhanced his own strength.28 The
failure of this was due to the intransigence of the emperor with regard to the ad-
vice of his counsellors, of whom Psellos was highly placed ‰‡7a.1.9Š. In the text,
Psellos shows a total disregard for flatterers or counsellors whom he considers as
the cause of the empire’s decline ‰‡7a.18.4–12Š.29
It is enlightening to bring here a detail from Attaleiates’ account: when
Constantine X rose to the throne, he restored in their positions several people who
had been dismissed by his predecessor, Isaac Komnenos. In this respect, we can-
not exclude the possibility that a new political rivalry between Psellos and court-
iers from the circle of Michael VI Stratiotikos arose again. Yet, this is nothing but
a mere conjecture, because there is no further information with regard to court fac-
tions at that time. Attaleiates, moreover, points out that the nature of Constantine
X’s character changed with his enthronement, because it was greatly affected by
his counsellors whose self-interest dominated their behaviour.30 He therefore be-
came the sole advisor of himself, though Psellos tried many times, as he claims, to
amend his dogmatism ‰‡7a. 18.12–14Š.
Although Psellos was highly rewarded for helping Constantine Doukas to
take the crown,31 he failed, however, to become one of the emperor’s close confi-
dants.32 Thus, his concern for the subsequent effect on the military of the govern-
ment fiscal policies is laid squarely on Constantine X’s other advisors. In addition,
we must take into consideration that Psellos pronounced sections of the
Chronographia in the presence of Constantine X’ss o n , Michael VII.33 Therefore,
his critique of Constantine X’s administration could be seen as an attempt to con-
vince Michael Doukas of the value of his work as an objective account, thereby
emphasizing his own skills as a court advisor.
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28 Attaleiates, 60.3–11, says that Constantine weakened the military establishments of the state
by withholding the payments of the soldiery, and dismissing the high-ranking officers. See also
Cheynet, La politique, 69.
29 This may explain why Psellos praises Basil II for ignoring the counsellors’ advice.
30 Attaleiates, 54.17–21, 59.1–5. Ljubarskij, Proswpikothta, 176–177, says that this is an in-
direct reference to Psellos and his colleagues. His argument is based upon the statement of the
Continuator of Skylitzes who fully implicates Psellos in the decline of the empire (see, Hs u n eceia
thj Cronografiaj tou Iwannou Skulitsh, ed. E. Th. Tsolakes, Thessalonice 1968). Given that this
statement is located in the section relating to the rule of Michael VII Doukas, we cannot directly criti-
cize Psellos for Constantine X’s handlings of state affairs.
31 K. Varzos, H Genealogiat w nK o m n h n wn, vol.1 ,Thessalonice 1984, 44–46.
32 See, MicahlY e l l oj, Cronografia, ed.-intro.-trans.-comm. V. Karalis, vol.2 ,Athens
1996, 373, n. 57. He maintains that there was a distance in the author’s relationship with the emperor.
33 Ibid., 475.***
To strengthen his argument that the Chronographia is favourable to the mil-
itary, A. Kaldellis refers to the way Psellos treats three emperors (Basil II, Isaac I,
Michael IV) and several officers of the army (Bardas Phokas, Bardas Skleros,
George Maniakes, Leo Tornikios).34 In the next pages, I am going to discuss these
cases following a chronological order:
Basil II: His reign, as Kaldellis says, forges a pattern of rulership in the
Chronographia. This is because Basil devoted most of his life on campaigns, and
because he established a tyrannical authority based on fear rather than on benevo-
lence.35 Following Kaldellis in his argumentation, we are surprised to discover
that Psellos lauds Basil for more or less the same reasons he attacks Romanos IV
Diogenes (1068–1071) in book seven. Diogenes too spent much of his time on
battlefields,36 and aspired to be the undisputed emperor of Byzantium. Certain
similarities between those two rulers’ personality traits have been spotted and are
listed in the table below:
Basil II (Book 1) Romanos IV (Book 7b)
1. ‰‡3.1–4Š ebouleto menm h d ena koinwnon
ecein twnf r o n t i s m atwn, mhde peri twn
koinwn dioikhsewn sumboulon.
2. ‰‡29.8–11Š Autojg o un hrce kai twn
bouleumatwn, autojd e ¸di¹etiqh kai ta
stratopeda¶ to de politikono u projt o uj
gegrammenouj nomouj…ekuberna
3. ‰‡29.7–8Š aprosdehj wsper twns o f w -
terwn etugcanen wn.
‰‡29.11–13Š oqen oude proseice logioij
andrasin…kai pantapasi katapefronhkei
‰‡11.7–8Š O de ebouleto mena utarceink a i
to kratoj twnp r a g m atwn ecein monwtatoj
‰‡19.1–3Š Wsper de eiwqei poiein enp asi
pragmasi politikoijt ek a i stratiwtikoij,
mh gnwmaj para tou lambanein twnp r axewn
‰‡14.2–5Š kai twn ent elei katapefronhkei,
kai twns u m b o ulwn afemenoj…eautJ proj
pan otioun ecrhto kai sumboulJ kai
parainetV.
4. ‰‡22.10–11Š Uperoptikwjd e eicen ou twn
allwn monon, all’ hdh kai tou adelfou
‰‡29.4–5Š ta te alla kata pollhn upero-
yian twn uphkown edra
‰‡10.5–6Š ta pleiwd e eirwnikojt ek a i ala-
zwn
‰‡14.1Š Auth profasij autJ prwth thj ala-
zoneiaj egeneto¶
These parallels are indicative of how the author’s account is affected by his
political interests. He exonerates the arrogant Basil for not listening to the philoso-
phers’ advice, but criticizes Diogenes for similar behaviour. Where is then the dif-
ference between those two cases? In the first, Psellos himself was not in the intel-
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34 Kaldellis, Argument, 178–185, discusses this subject in Chapter 25, Philosophy and the
Throne (esp. 182–184).
35 Ibid., 43–44, 51–52.
36 For example, Attaleiates, 77.18, reports that Diogenes conducted his maiden campaign
against the Seljuks in Anatolia only two months after his enthronement.lectual environment of the imperial court, and thus may not be concerned if Basil
ignored the wise people of Byzantium at that time.37 In the second, he was in the
imperial court indeed, but not in the innermost circle of Diogenes’ advisors and
consultants ‰‡‡7b.12.5–7, 17.7–8Š. We may presume that this was very annoying
for such a powerful courtier who had turned out to be the most trusted confidant of
Diogenes’ predecessor, Constantine X Doukas. On these grounds, one can see
how the author’s own situation influenced his adverse commentary on Diogenes
in the Chronographia.38
Also, we must bear in mind that Psellos judges Basil II, whom he never met,
by the outcome of his policies. During his reign the Byzantine state had reached
its zenith. The treasury coffers were overflowing and the boundaries of the state
stretched from the Euphrates River to southern Italy and from the Danube to Crete
and Cyprus. It was, therefore, difficult for Psellos to express an opinion against
the public’s and criticize the emperor who continued to be very popular among the
succeeding generations.39
Bardas Phokas, Bardas Skleros: The introduction of these two generals in
the Chronographia, Kaldellis asserts, gives the impression that they would have
been as successful emperors as Basil himself was. Kaldellis’ view relies on the
way their physical details and martial skills are described in book one. A question
that raises here is: if Basil is genuinely presented as the best ruler that the empire
had ever had, then why should the Chronographia encourage his identification
with Bardas Phokas and Bardas Skleros? The description of the outward appear-
ance and valour of the two generals must not be related to the above consideration,
because Psellos’ notion of humanism puts emphasis on the superiority of inner
virtues over external ones.40 Especially in the case of Skleros, it is even harder to
believe that he would have made an ideal ruler in Psellos’ eyes. The mentioning of
Skleros’ advanced age in two successive sections of the book is noteworthy
‰‡‡1.26.11, 27.7Š.
Michael IV: Though he was not an emperor of military background, the
Chronographia treats him in a favourable light, Kaldellis maintains, because he
took personal interest in the army ‰‡4.19.20–21Š. To reinforce his argument, the
scholar proceeds to a comparison of Michael IV with Basil II saying that: a) both
lacked Hellenic culture; and b) both indulged in pleasures before they realized the
weight of the duties of a sovereign ruler.41 Yet, it is questionable how the two ele-
ments are linked with Psellos’ alleged preference for military emperors.
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37 Cf. Kaldellis, Argument, 179–180.
38 The growing arrogance of Romanos Diogenes acts as the core of the text, and reflects the
author’s strong animosity towards this ruler. Ljubarskij, Proswpikothta, 319–320; idem, The
Byzantine Irony — The Case of Michael Psellos, edd. A. Avramea, A. Laiou, E. Chrysos, Byzantine
State and Society, in Memory of N. Oikonomides, Athens 2003, 357–358.
39 It is also Karalis who states that Psellos idealizes Basil II mainly because he never met him
(idem, Cronografia, 475).
40 On the physical descriptions of Psellos’ heroes, Ljubarskij, Proswpikothta, 329–346, esp. 330.
41 Kaldellis, Argument, 57, 94.There is, in my opinion, another angle through which to understand the au-
thor’s liking for Michael IV. This is the clear sense of justice the latter had when
he took control of government. Psellos points out that it was a tradition for new
emperors to give titles and honours to citizens, senators, and military officers. Yet,
Michael IV neither replaced the senate, nor did he promote his close friends to the
highest positions, if they lacked experience ‰‡4.10.10–17Š.42 In the
Chronographia, we learn that Theodora also ignored this tradition, and governed
by a clear sense of justice during her reign in 1055–1056 ‰‡6a.3.1–4Š. The au-
thor’s commentary on the refusal of these two rulers (of both of whom he speaks
in tones of praise) to follow the practices of their predecessors cannot be acciden-
tal. The answer to why this subject was of great importance for Psellos may be
found in the section relating to Constantine IX who is blamed for exactly the op-
posite reasons: he reduced the cursus honorum ‰‡6.29.15–21Š; he promoted a great
number of people to higher positions indiscriminately;43 and he allowed citizens
of humble origin to become members of the senate.44 Such unfair policies were
clearly an anathema to Psellos.45 They undermined the stability of the state and
often resulted in revolutionary uprisings.46
George Maniakes, Leo Tornikios: One after another, the two officers of the
army rose in revolt against the central government. Kaldellis remarks that
Maniakes gained the admiration of Psellos, because he possessed the skills to re-
deem the declining fate of the empire. Since Psellos enjoyed privileges and a ris-
ing political career in the reign of Constantine IX, it is unlikely therefore he
wished a change of power to Maniakes. The latter, as all new incumbents, would
apparently replace advisors and ministers with others loyal to himself. Af u r t h e r
element that needs special attention is the author’s statement of the death of the
rebel general: for some it was injustice, and for others it was not ‰‡6.86.1–2Š.47
Safe conclusions cannot be extracted, but what purpose does this statement serve
in the text? Given the general discontent with the emperor’s unpopular measures,
only some court officials would be relieved at the news of Maniakes’ death. And
our author undoubtedly was one of them. For those reasons one should therefore
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42 Short references to Michael IV’s great qualities are also found in Skylitzes, 415.53–54;
Attaleiates,8 . 9 ;and Kekaumenos, Strathgikon, intro.-trans.-comm. D. Tsougarakis,3 rd ed., Athens
1996, 261.
43 Michael Psellos particularly mentions Pardos ‰‡6.80.6–10Š and Romanos Boilas ‰ibid.,
‡6.140.13Š. As to Boilas, cf. Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XIII–XVIII, ed. Th. Buttner
— Wobst, CSHB, Bonn 1897, 645.14 (= Zonaras). Of similar interest are the cases of Romanos
Skleros ‰Skylitzes, 427.61–63Š and Nikephoros ‰Skylitzes, 464.13–19; Attaleiates, 25.16–17Š. They
both rose to high ranks simply because of their intimacy with the emperor.
44 Presumably, Psellos refers to the logothetes John ‰‡6.177.5–6; Zonaras, 649.12–17Š.
45 The concern of Psellos for the proper functioning of the hierarchy system as a whole is also
evident in the emphasis he places on Maniakes’ gradual promotions to general ‰‡6.76.1–7Š.
46 The above consideration could also challenge Kaldellis’ assumption on why Theodora and
Michael IV Paphlagon in the Chronographia are not rebuked for their pious devotion so much as
other rulers, like Romanos III and Constantine IX. Cf., idem, Argument, 79, 94.
47 The reason for which Maniakes rose in revolt was his violent contests with Romanos
Skleros on account of the limits of their estates ‰Skylitzes, 427–57–59Š.separate any admiration of Psellos for Maniakes from any desire to see him as-
sume power.
The Chronographia does not contain any favourable comments on Leo
Tornikios himself, but gives a vivid description of the impact of his revolt on the
citizens of Byzantium. They were dissatisfied with Constantine IX, hence they
preferred to see on the throne a warlike emperor able to defend the state from ex-
ternal threats ‰‡6.104.26–28Š. Kaldellis assumes that Psellos too had the same
wish. This assumption however does not, in fact, correspond to Psellos’ recorded
pleasure at the failed revolt of Leo ‰‡6.120.1–2Š. In all probability, the expression
of his feelings in the text reflects the survival of his own position.
Isaac I Komnenos: Kaldellis takes the view that Psellos treats Isaac I as the
man who, after Basil II, was able to make the empire survive and flourish through
a forceful military leadership. But the answer why such a view is not plausible is
given, in fact, by the scholar himself:
Though an official ambassador, Psellos personally had no objection to the fall of
Michael (namely, Stratiotikos) per se. However, he was worried that his open asso-
ciation with the Emperor’s regime would bring him into disfavor with the new mil-
itary rulers, and he feared that his own enemies would seize the opportunity to de-
stroy him.
48
In other words, Kaldellis accepts that Psellos’ account of Isaac contains po-
litical rather than patriotic components. It was under his reign (1057–1059) that
Psellos was recognized as a philosopher and wise counsellor ‰‡‡7.39, 42Š. This
can easily explain our author’s initial approval of the policy of Isaac for the state
protection. The narrative becomes critical of him at the moment that he imposed
strict measures on people, clerics, senators, and military officers. Psellos disagrees
with the way Isaac handled the situation.49 He declares that his criticism does not
actually apply to the initiatives taken, but to the timing of their implementation
‰‡7.58.17–19Š. However, there is an important detail to consider: the sudden
change in the emperor’s behaviour. He became abrasive and ignored the advice of
wise counsellors ‰‡7.62.13–14Š, of whom Psellos was now one. On this account,
the author stresses that Isaac proved inferior to his task, implying that he was not a
good choice for emperor ‰‡7.51.20–21Š.50
To sum up: the present paper challenges Anthony Kaldellis’ opinion on the
favourable treatment of the military in the Chronographia. His argument, how-
ever, does not answer a crucial question: if “the true subject matter of the
Chronographia is not the decline of the State, but the revival of philosophy”, and
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48 Kaldellis, Argument, 168. More details about the relationship between the two men are
found in Chapter 24, Psellos and Isaac Komnenos, 167–178.
49 Attaleiates 47.27–48.2, tells us that Isaac’s measures increased the revenues of the state
without causing discontent among the citizens.
50 The administrative failure of Isaac Komnenos is also attested in the next section of the
Chronographia, where it is written that one of the main concerns of the new emperor was to introduce
a fair system of government ‰‡7a.2.4Š.if the book “culminates in an extravagant vindication of Psellos’ political
skills”,51 then how can we presume that the author is really concerned for the
army? And it is beyond doubts that the fate of the army is inextricably linked to
t h ef a t ea n dd e c l i n eo ft h es t a t e . Kaldellis himself maintains that the author be-
longed to those courtiers who exploited their rhetorical skills for their own advan-
tage, and acknowledged that “many of his activities at court were self-serving”.52
It is, therefore, reasonable to accept that Psellos’ statements about the army were
adjusted to serve the needs of the moment. In this respect, his judgement of mili-
tary emperors and some court officials is made more by the influence it has on his
own reputation than any true objectivity. Through his effort to convince the audi-
ence of his patriotic and altruistic motives, Psellos seems to show a genuine inter-
est in the army. But in fact he attacks the rulers who did not fully trust his own po-
litical ability, and admonishes the courtiers who tried to undermine his career in
the imperial court.
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Andonios Vratimos
DA LI PSELOVA ZAINTERESOVANST ZA VOJSKU
U HRONOGRAFIJI UOP[TE NIJE MOTIVISANA
LI^NIM RAZLOZIMA?
U sredi{tu pa`we ovog rada jeste odnos Mihaila Psela prema vojsci,
kako je prikazan u wegovoj Hronografiji. @ele}i da ubedi ~itaoce u svoja
patriotska ose}awa, pisac sebe naziva filoromejem (filorwmaioj)irodo-
qubom (filopatrij). U monografiji „The Argument of Psellos’ Chrono-
graphia“ Entoni Kaldelis je Pselove navode ocenio kao apsolutno istinite,
tvrde}i da se Psel izuzetno mnogo interesovao za de{avawa u vojsci. Ciq
ovog rada jeste da ispita koliko su Pselove patriotske izjave iskrene, te da
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svaki pomen vojske u kwigama o Romanu III Argiru, Zoji i Teodori, Mihailu
VI Stratiotiku i Konstantinu X Duki. U drugom delu se preispituju Kal-
delisovi argumenti, koji se zasnivaju na na~inu kako su u Hronografiji
predstavqena tri cara (Vasilije II,M i h a i l oIV Paflagonac i Isak I Kom-
nin) i ~etiri vojskovo|e (Varda Foka, Varda Sklir, Georgije Manijakis i
Lav Tornikije). Autor je do{ao do zakqu~ka da je svaki pomen vojske u Pse-
lovom delu neraskidivo povezan sa pi{~evim li~nim motivom da se pri-
ka`e kao najstru~niji i najprikladniji dvorski savetnik. Pokazalo se da su
wegovi pogledi uvek u skladu sa wegovim politi~kim stavovima, budu}i da
osu|uje one careve na koje je imao vrlo mali uticaj, dok, naprotiv, podr`ava
one ~ije je puno po{tovawe i poverewe u`ivao.
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